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Abstract: IEEE 802.22 standard utilizes cognitive radio (CR) techniques to allow sharing 
unused spectrum band. The cognitive radio is vulnerable to various attacks such as jamming 
attacks. This paper has focused on coordinated jamming attacks. A simple strategy for secondary 
users is to change their bands and switch to other appropriate bands when the jamming attack is 
occurred. Also, the malicious users should switch to other bands in order to jam the secondary 
users. To address this problem, a game theoretical method is proposed to analyze coordinated 
jamming attacks in CR. Then, using Nash equilibrium on the proposed game, the most 
appropriate bands have been found to switch as well as the optimal switching probabilities for 
both secondary and malicious users. Meanwhile, effects of different parameters like the number 
of malicious users are investigated in changing the optimal switching probabilities by analysis on 
the model. 
Keywords: IEEE 802.22 Networks, Cognitive Radio, Coordinated Jamming Attacks, Game 
Theory. 
 
I. Introduction  
The IEEE 802.22 standard is a solution to dynamic spectrum access (DSA) that is known as 
the cognitive radio. To enable DSA networks, the use of cognitive radio technology is being 
considered due to its ability to rapidly and autonomously adapt operating parameters to change 
the requirements and conditions. 
In cognitive radio, secondary users get access to the licensed spectrum if there is no primary 
user. The secondary users must leave the spectrum as soon as the primary users need to access 
the band1, 2. Thus, the secondary users always observe the spectrum band in order to avoid 
collision with the primary users. 
Cognitive radio operates on wireless media. The wireless network makes security 
vulnerabilities unavoidable. An attack on the cognitive radio network can be designed as any 
kind of activity that leads to unacceptable interference with the licensed primary users or missed 
opportunities for the secondary users. The malicious users try to prevent the secondary or 
  
 
primary users using the spectrum band. Numerous papers have concentrated on studying the 
behavior of malicious users in IEEE 802.223-5. There are three types of attacks in physical layer 
for the secondary users: Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUE)6, 7, Reporting False Sensing 
Data Attacks (RFSD)8, 9 and Jamming Attacks10, 11.  
In the distributed spectrum sensing, malicious users can send false data to the fusion center 
which leads to incorrect spectrum sensing and decision. This attack is called Reporting False 
Sensing Data Attack (RFSD). Authors12 propose a new method which employs a variable 
number of samples instead of fixed samples for sensing data. Furthermore, the RFSD attacks 
have studied13 when the number of malicious users is unknown and an onion-peeling approach is 
proposed to defend against multiple untrustworthy secondary nodes. 
Malicious users can modify air interface to minimize signal characteristics of the primary 
users. Thus the secondary users deem it as the primary user’s signal and leave the band14. This 
attack was first introduced by Chan and Pank15. The first analytical model to confront PUE 
attacks based on the received power of primary and malicious users is studied by Anand16. A 
Bayesian game is considered17 to model PUE attacks according to the power received from 
malicious and secondary users. 
Li and Han studied a PUE attack by a dogfight game in cognitive radio networks18. They 
argued that in PUE attack the secondary users should switch to appropriate bands like jamming 
attack. So they solved the PUE attack by a game theoretical approach and determined the 
appropriate bands and optimal switching probabilities for both secondary and malicious users. 
Then, they introduced a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) model to 
analyze the PUE attack. They presented a model which is only utilized for single malicious user, 
and further improved their work19.  
The jamming attack is harmful in these networks since the malicious users wish to interrupt 
communication sessions of the secondary users by making interference. When the generated 
interference of the malicious users is high enough, they can substantially decrease the 
communication performance or even terminate it by running DoS attacks. 
The jamming attack in multichannel cognitive radio networks is introduced9, which is aimed 
to avoid the jamming signal through frequency hopping. A Markov Decision Process (MDP) 
model for jamming attacks is introduced20 as a countermeasure with a learning method being 
suggested for the secondary users are able to learn the access pattern of the primary users as well 
as the number of malicious users. This paper extends the previous work done21 and recommends 
a stochastic game framework for anti-jamming defense design, which can accommodate dynamic 
spectrum opportunity and channel quality, as well as the strategy of secondary and malicious 
users. 
A simple strategy of secondary and malicious users for defense and attack in jamming attacks 
through CRN is switching to another frequency band, but determination of the appropriate bands 
for switching should not be overlooked. Meanwhile, it is necessary to determine optimal 
probabilities of switching to appropriate bands. A cooperated jamming attack is studied by Tan, 
Sengupt and Subbalakshmi22. They determined appropriate bands for switching in addition to 
optimal switching probabilities just for the malicious users.  One major drawback of their work22 
is that it does not determine appropriate bands and optimal switching probabilities for the 
secondary users. Another drawback of their work22 is its inability to consider the role of primary 
users. But in this contribution, a game theoretical method has been utilized for analysis of a 
  
 
coordinated attack by considering the role of secondary, malicious and primary users followed 
by deriving optimal bands for the strategies of both malicious and secondary users.  
In this model, there is a base station for secondary users that is called secondary-BS. The 
secondary-BS may be a fusion center (FC) or a typical secondary user. Also, a base station for 
malicious users is used which is known as the malicious-BS (Fig. 1). The malicious-BS manages 
malicious users and sends them to an appropriate band where no other malicious user exists. 
Also the secondary-BS manages secondary users and informs them about the free bands. 
 
Secondary users Malicious users 
Secondary-BS
Malicious-BS
Primary  users  
Fig. 1.  The malicious and the secondary users with their base stations 
 
In this article, it is supposed that secondary users make use of the switching strategy against 
jamming attack. The main purpose here is to determine appropriate bands for switching as well 
as optimal switching probabilities for both secondary and malicious users. Thus, the spectrum 
band is classified in accordance with presence or absence of primary, secondary and malicious 
networks. Thereby, appropriate bands were found for the next time slot of secondary and 
malicious users based on the proposed game. Then the coordinated attack was formulated as a 
cooperated game regarding the role of secondary, malicious and primary users while the optimal 
switching probabilities was calculated for both secondary and malicious users via Nash 
equilibrium of the proposed game. 
A reward value was defined for successful transmissions of secondary users and a reward 
value for successful attacks of malicious users in addition to cost values for switching to other 
bands for both of them. It was demonstrated that total payoffs of secondary and malicious users, 
depend just on their own cost and reward values, rather than cost and reward values of their rival. 
But their optimal switching probabilities of secondary and the malicious users are dependent on 
cost and reward values of the rival instead of their own cost and reward values. 
  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: System model, assumptions and proposed 
classification are described in section II. In section III, a coordinated game is formulated between 
malicious and secondary users which has derived an analytical expression for payoffs and 
optimal switching probabilities of them. Numerical results are discussed in section IV. Finally, 
summary and conclusions are made in section V. 
II. System model 
The IEEE 802.22 standard defines a point-multipoint air-interface, composed of a base station 
and several Consumer Premise Equipment (CPEs). The base station is responsible for collecting 
spectrum sensing information provided by several CPEs and controlling the medium access. 
Suppose a network with Nn  spectrum bands which can be occupied with pn  primary users and 
sn  secondary users. The secondary users are managed with a central base station (secondary-BS) 
to get the optimal performance. It is supposed that there are mn  malicious nodes managed by 
central base station (Malicious-BS) to establish a coordinated attack on the secondary users. The 
primary users can occupy the band at any time and we further assume that the malicious users do 
not want to establish the jamming attack on the primary users like some papers20, 21. Fig .1 
demonstrates the secondary and malicious users along with their base stations. 
Time is divided into several time slots. At the beginning of each time slot, both secondary and 
malicious users are synchronized with primary users. The secondary user can access the band if 
no primary activity is sensed after receiving the signal. The malicious user senses the secondary 
signal when there no primary signal is detected and then tries to jam the band if the malicious 
user finds the secondary user without any primary users. Fig. 2 depicts priority of the sensing 
spectrum band for secondary, primary and malicious users.  
The spectrum occupancy of each channel for primary users is modeled by a two-state Markov 
chain (ON-OFF model) which is illustrated in Fig. 3.  
Two states of this Markov chain are idle ( I , no primary user exists in the band) and busy ( B , 
one primary user exists in the band). The spectrum occupancy hops between these two states 
depending on the value of   and  . For simplicity, it is assumed that   and   have the same 
values for all Nn  spectrum bands. 
Transmission 
Sensing primary 
users
Transmission 
Jamming attack  
Sensing secondary 
users
Sensing primary 
users
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T(Time)
  
Fig. 2. The priority of spectrum band Sensing for the primary, secondary and malicious users 
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                Fig. 3. Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) model for spectrum occupancy of each channel for the 
primary users23 
By solving the steady-state Markov chains in Fig. 3, the probabilities for a specific channel 
being busy by one primary user ( pBP ) or idle ( plP ) in an arbitrary time slot are given by Eq. (1) 
and Eq. (2), respectively: 
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=
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It is also assumed that   and   have the same values for all Nn  spectrum bands like some 
works20, 21. So plP  and pBP  show the same values for all Nn  spectrum bands. 
In the proposed model, there are three kinds of players: primary, secondary and malicious 
users. Thus, taking into account the absence or presence of each type of these users, eight 
different states can be defined for occupation of bands (Fig. 4a) as below: 
1- The bands are occupied by malicious and secondary users. 
2- The bands are occupied by secondary users. 
3- The bands are occupied by malicious users. 
4- The bands are occupied by secondary, malicious and primary users. 
5- The bands are occupied by primary and malicious users. 
6- The bands are occupied by secondary and primary users. 
7- The bands are occupied by primary users. 
8- Free bands 
In our model, it is supposed that malicious and secondary users send information of their own 
occupied bands to their base stations. According to the current situation of the next time slot, this 
information is useful for the base station to decide what the distribution of its members is. Each 
one of secondary and malicious users has the mere information about the state of its own band 
and sends it to the base station. That is why malicious-BS and secondary-BS represent different 
information about occupation of the bands. Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c present different states of the 
bands from the view point of secondary-BS and malicious-BS, respectively.  According to Fig. 
4b, four classes are seen from the view point of the secondary-BS for the states of bands ( cba ,,
and d ): 
1- The bands are occupied by malicious and secondary users ( a ). 
2- The bands are occupied by secondary users ( b ).  
3- The bands are occupied by secondary and primary users ( c ).  
4- The bands with unknown states ( d ).   
  
 
 
 
Fig. 4a. The eight states of bands by presenting the malicious, primary and secondary users 
 
Fig. 4b. Four states of bands from the viewpoint of the secondary-BS 
 
Fig. 4c. Four states of bands from the viewpoint of the malicious-BS 
 
In Fig. 4a, the secondary users in states 4 and 6 sense the primary users, thus they cannot use 
these bands and the malicious users do not jam the secondary users. This leads to a situation in 
which the secondary users cannot recognize presence of the malicious users in the bands of states 
4 and 6 and they would report incomplete information to the secondary-BS. Thus, the secondary-
BS cannot distinguish between states 4 and 6 and behaves it as if it is just state c . There is no 
secondary user in the bands of states 3, 5, 7 and 8. Therefore, the secondary-BS does not have 
any information about these states. As a result, the states 3, 5, 7 and 8 look the same from the 
viewpoint of secondary-BS with state d (Fig. 4b). Similarly, according to Fig. 4c, there are four 
classes of states ( CBA ,, and D ) from the viewpoint of malicious-BS: 
1- The bands are occupied by malicious and secondary users ( A ). 
2- The bands are occupied by malicious users ( B ). 
3- The bands are occupied by malicious and primary users ( C ). 
4- The bands with unknown state ( D ).  
The malicious-BS deems states 4 and 5 as state C while observing states 2, 6, 7 and 8 as state 
D . 
  
 
 
III. Nash equilibrium 
This section models attack and defense problems using a static game. Goal of the game is to 
find appropriate bands for switching as well as optimal switching probabilities to maximize 
secondary and malicious users’ payoff functions simultaneously. 
Fig. 4b shows that secondary users of the bands of state a  cannot switch to the bands of states 
b and c , since secondary-BS knows that other secondary users exist in the bands of states b and 
c  and tries to avoid collision between them. Therefore, there are only two strategies for 
secondary users in the bands of state a : staying in the bands of state a  or switching to the bands 
of state d . The probability of staying in the bands of state a  is denoted with aaP  while the 
probability of switching from the bands of state a  to those of state d  is represented with adP   as 
shown in Fig. 4b.  
As described before, from the viewpoint of malicious-BS and secondary-BS, the spectrum 
bands are classified into four states. Moreover, there are only two different strategies for each 
state. The strategies in each state are depicted in Figs. 4b and 4c for secondary and malicious 
users, respectively. Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) address the same strategies for other states:  
                             cb,a,l     PP ldll =−= 1  (3) 
                            CB,A,k   PP kDkk =−= 1  (4) 
Having defined the appropriate bands for switching, secondary and malicious users should 
now calculate the optimal probabilities for either staying in their band or switching to other 
appropriate bands. A game theory is used to find these optimal switching probabilities. 
Therefore, the payoff functions of secondary and malicious users should be maximized in order 
to find Nash equilibrium.  
 
A. General algorithm for calculating Nash equilibrium:  
Both malicious-BS and secondary-BS should calculate the payoff function in every state. 
Secondary and malicious users have only two strategies: staying in their band or switching to 
other bands (state d  for the secondary users or state D  for the malicious users). We define a 
payoff function for those strategies:  
The secondary users’ payoff function for staying in the band a,b,c , lU ll ==  
 The malicious users’ payoff function for staying in the band A,B,C  ,kUkk ==   (5) 
 
     The secondary users’ payoff function for switching a,b,c ,lU ld ==  
    The malicious users’ payoff function for switching A,B,C,kUkD  ==  (6) 
 
In order to calculate the payoff functions, the cost value of switching to a band is shown with 
mC  for malicious users and sC  for secondary users. The value of malicious reward by 
performing a successful jamming attack on secondary users is mG  while the value of secondary 
reward by establishment of a successful connection without malicious and primary users is 
  
 
denoted by sG . Penalty of secondary user, attacked by the malicious users is sL . As current 
connections are interrupted, they call for an extra effort to re-establish a new connection.  
The secondary users can establish a connection and obtain a reward sG  in a band when there 
are no primary, secondary or malicious users in their band like the bands of state 2 in Fig. 4a. 
jsE represents the number of bands expected by secondary-BS and malicious-BS to occupy just 
with secondary users in the next time slot.  
Malicious users can jam a band and obtain the reward mG  when there is only one secondary 
user in its band at the absence of primary users like the bands of state 1 in Fig. 4a. In this 
situation, the loss of secondary user would be given by sL . jsmE is the number of bands that 
secondary-BS and malicious-BS expect to be occupied only by secondary and malicious users in 
the next time slot. 
Other states of arrangement for secondary, malicious and primary users in Fig. 4a do not bear 
any gains or penalties for secondary and malicious users and even no effect on calculating the 
payoff function of secondary and malicious users. 
For calculation of jsE , the probability of occupying each band just by secondary users should 
be calculated ( jsP ). Moreover, for calculation of jsmE , it is necessary to compute the probability 
of occupation for each band just by secondary and malicious users ( jsmP ). In order to calculate 
jsP  and jsmP , the probability of occupation of each band by primary, malicious and secondary 
users should be computed first and these probabilities are specified with pP , mP  and sP , 
respectively. 
Calculations in part (B) and (C) of this section demonstrate if these payoff functions are 
arranged by the switching probabilities, the payoff functions of secondary (malicious) users at 
each state can be separated into product of their switching probabilities and a linear function of 
the switching probabilities for malicious (secondary) users. All of these payoff functions should 
be maximized together to reproduce Nash equilibrium for this problem. Thus, derivative of 
payoff ratios for the switching probabilities are taken to simultaneously maximize the payoff 
functions of malicious and secondary users. This leads to two systems of three equations and 
three unknowns. The optimal switching probabilities for the secondary users are obtained by 
solving these two systems. 
One system of three equations and three unknowns is based on the switching probabilities of 
secondary (malicious) users. This system is the result of maximizing the payoff functions of 
malicious (secondary) users. 
Therefore, secondary-BS (malicious-BS) should calculate the payoff functions of malicious 
(secondary) users while maximizing them to address the system of three equations and three 
unknowns based on the switching probabilities of secondary (malicious) users. Then, secondary-
BS (malicious-BS) will calculate the switching probabilities of secondary (malicious) users by 
solving the system of equations. Fig. 5 illustrates this algorithm for calculating the optimal 
switching probabilities.  
 
  
 
Table 1. The probability of occupation of one band in state k  with the secondary, malicious and primary users 
State The occupation probability of one band  
in state k  with primary users 
The occupation probability of one 
band in state k  with a secondary user 
The occupation probability of one 
band in state k  with a malicious user 
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B. optimal switching probabilities for secondary users 
Like the algorithm proposed in Fig. 5,
k
pP , kmP  and 
k
sP (the occupation probabilities of one 
band in state ),,,( DCBAkk = by primary, malicious and secondary users, respectively) are 
derived first (Table 1). 
In Table 1, kn  denotes the number of bands at state ),,,( DCBAkk =  (Fig. 4c) while in  gives 
the number of bands in state )8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1( =ii  (Fig. 4a). Also, 
D
mn is the number of malicious 
users that will switch to the bands of state D in the next time slot (Eq. (7)).  
                                                CDCBDBADA
D
m PnPnPnn ++=  (7) 
  
Fig. 5. An algorithm for calculate the optimal switching probabilities 
The secondary-BS needs to discover the number of bands at each state of )8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1( =ii  
and ),,,( DCBAkk =  in order to derive the probability values from Table 1. Since some of this 
  
 
information is unknown, one has to assess the number of bands at all states. Using the 
information gathered from secondary users, secondary-BS knows the number of  
secondary users in band an and bn .Therefore, 1n  and 2n are calculated from Eq. (8). 
                                   ba nnnn == 21 ,  (8) 
Furthermore, secondary-BS knows that am nn −  malicious users are at the states c  and d . 
Although secondary-BS does not know exactly how many of these am nn −  malicious users are 
in state c  and how many of them are in state d . Thus, secondary-BS assumes that malicious 
users are distributed uniformly through the bands of state c  and d . Therefore, 4n and 6n  are 
derivable as demonstrated by Eq. (9): 
                                                     nnn  
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So, 41 nnnm −−  malicious users are in state d  and then number of the primary users ( pn ) is: 
pBNp Pnn =  (10) 
Also, there are cp nn −  primary users in the bands of state d . It is trivial to find 5n , 3n , 7n and 
8n , respectively: 
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(11) 
 
We suppose that 
k
jsmP
 
is the probability that one band in state  k  to be occupied just by 
secondary and malicious users at the absence of primary users. This probability can be calculated 
according to Eq. (12).  
                                           DC,B,A,k   PPPP kp
k
m
k
s
k
jsm =−= )1(  (12) 
For the bands of state k , 
k
jsmE is the number of bands that secondary-BS expects to be 
occupied just by secondary and malicious users without primary users in the next time slot.   
                                       DC,B,A,k   PnE kjsmk
k
jsm ==  (13) 
The payoff functions for malicious users that remain in their band can be computed from Eq. 
(14): 
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k
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AAU , BBU and CCU  are calculated from Eq. (14). The payoff functions for malicious users that 
switch to the bands of state D are: 
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(15) 
Therefore, ADU , BDU and CDU  are obtained from Eq. (15). Nash equilibrium of this game 
occurs where the payoffs of two strategies (stay and switch) are equal. 
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(16) 
If equalizations of Eq. (16) are assigned, three linear functions for the switching probabilities  
of secondary users can be obtained. 
                                                          
0),,(
0),,(
0),,(
=
=
=
cdbdad
cdbdad
cdbdad
PPPH
PPPG
PPPF
 (17) 
All of three equalizations should be established simultaneously to determine Nash equilibrium 
of this problem. This problem leads to a system of three equations and three unknowns. By 
solving this system, the optimal switching probabilities for secondary users will be obtained.  
At each time slot, every secondary user senses its band and reports the secondary-BS state of 
its band. The secondary-BS, calculates the number of bands in each state with Eqs.(8) to (11) 
according to its gathered information. Afterwards, the secondary-BS computes the payoff 
functions of malicious users and optimal switching probabilities for secondary users. Thus, 
according to the optimal switching probabilities derived, secondary-BS decides which secondary 
user should stay at their bands and which secondary user should switch to the bands of state d . 
The secondary-BS should organize the switching of secondary users in the bands of state d  in 
order to avoid their collision. 
 
C. optimal switching probabilities for malicious users 
l
pP , 
l
mP and 
l
sP are the probabilities of occupation for a band in state ),,,( dcball = by 
primary, malicious and secondary users, respectively. These probabilities are computed in Table 
2.  
In Table 2, ln  is the number of bands in state l ,while 
d
sn  gives the number of secondary users 
that will switch to the bands of state d  at the next time slot (Eq. (18)). 
                                        cdcbdbada
d
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For calculating the probability values from Table 2, malicious-BS needs to know the number 
of bands at each state of )8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1( =ii  and ),,,( dcball = .  
Since it does not know some of them, one has to just assess them. Similar to part (B), 
malicious-BS assesses the bands of different states. Table 3 lists the assessments on the number 
of bands by malicious-BS. For calculation of the number of different states, different arrays of 
Table 3 should be derived sequentially.  
Table 2. The probability of occupation one band in state l  with secondary, malicious and primary users 
State The occupation  probability of one 
band  in state l  with a primary user
 
The occupation  probability of one 
band in state l  with a secondary user 
The occupation  probability of one band 
in state l  with a malicious user 
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It is supposed that 
l
jsP  is the probability that one band in state l  is occupied just with 
secondary user and it is computed by Eq. (19). 
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Thus for the bands of state l , 
l
jsE  is the number of bands that the malicious-BS expects to be 
occupied just with secondary users at the next time slot, consequently: 
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l
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l
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(20) 
l
jsmP is the probability of one band in state l  being occupied just by secondary and malicious 
users in the absence of primary users. This probability is calculated from Eq. (21).  
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l
p
l
m
l
s
l
jsm =−= )1(  
(21) 
Thus, for the bands of state l , 
l
jsmE denotes the number of bands that malicious-BS expects to 
be occupied just by secondary and malicious users with no primary users at the next time slot.   
                                          dc,b,a,l        PnE
l
jsml
l
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(22) 
The payoff functions for secondary users which remain in their band are presented in Eq. (23) 
below: 
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Table 3. Assessment of the number of bands in each state by the Malicious-BS 
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Values of aaU , bbU  and ccU  can be derived from Eq. (24). The payoff functions for secondary 
users that switches to the bands of state d  are introduced below: 
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(24) 
Then, adU , bdU  and cdU  can be determined from Eq. (24). Such as before, Nash equilibrium 
of this game for malicious users is where payoffs of two strategies (stay and switch) are equal. 
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By sorting Eq. (25), three linear functions for the switching probabilities of malicious users 
can be generated. 
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By solving another system of three equations and three unknowns, the optimal switching 
probabilities for malicious users will be obtained.  
At every time slot, each malicious user reports malicious-BS state of its band. The malicious-
BS, calculates the number of bands in each state according to the received information (Table 3). 
Afterwards, malicious-BS adopts to extract the payoff functions of secondary users as well as the 
optimal switching probabilities of malicious users. Then, according to the computed optimal 
switching probabilities, malicious-BS decides which malicious users should stay in their bands 
and which should switch to the bands of state D . For avoiding collision between malicious 
users, malicious-BS should organize their switching in the bands of state D . 
 
IV. Numerical results  
In this section, numerical simulation is launched to evaluate performance of the proposed 
game against coordinated jamming attacks. The total payoff for secondary users is shown with 
sU while the total payoff for malicious users is represented by mU . 
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Before studying the numerical results, it is better to notice where the total payoff for 
secondary users ( sU ) are negative. It means that by using Nash equilibrium for this situation, 
secondary users will not have any positive payoff from switching to other bands or staying in 
their bands, so they will leave network for the next time slot, although they may go back to the 
network after ending the next time slot. The initial values of different analytical results are: 
50=Nn , 10=sn , 10=mn , 1=SC , 1=mC , 50=sG , 75=mG , 100=sL , 4.0= , 6.0= .  
 
 
Fig. 6. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus the secondary users’ reward value 
Fig. 6 demonstrates that increasing sG  does not significantly affect the switching probabilities 
of secondary users but increases their payoff. The negative payoffs for secondary users in Fig. 6 
show that switching strategy for secondary users to avoid jamming attacks involves no payoff for 
  
 
secondary users. Thus, secondary users will leave the network for the coming time slot. Raising 
sG  does not have any effect on the payoff of malicious users but it tends to change their 
switching probabilities. With increasing sG  the incentive of malicious users in states A  and B  
are decreased for switching to state D  while the incentive of malicious users in state C  is 
increased for switching to state D . 
Fig. 7 demonstrates that increasing mG  does not affect the payoff of secondary users much but 
alters their switching probabilities. So the motivation of secondary users in state b  is decreased 
for switching to state d  and the motivation of secondary users in bands a  and c  is increased for 
switching to state d . Increasing mG  does not affect the switching probabilities of malicious users 
but increases their payoff instead.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus the malicious users’ reward value 
 
 
Fig. 8. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus the secondary users’ cost value 
  
 
Fig. 8 shows that increasing sC  does not change the secondary users’ switching probabilities 
but decreases their payoff. Also, increasing sC  does not change the malicious users’ payoff but 
causes the malicious users in state B  to have more motivation to switch to state D  and decreases 
the probability of switching them from state A  and C  to state D . 
The effect of changing mC  is demonstrated in Fig. 9. The results demonstrate that increasing 
mC  does not considerably affect the payoff  of secondary users but changes their optimal 
switching probabilities. Decreasing the motivation of secondary users in state b  for switching to 
state d  and increasing the motivation of secondary users in states a  and c  for switching to state 
d  are consequences of increasing mC . Also increasing mC  will decrease the payoff of malicious 
users but will not alter their switching probabilities much. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus the malicious users’ cost value 
 
 
Fig. 10. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus the secondary users’ lost value 
  
 
The results of analytical simulation in Fig. 10 show that increasing sL  does not change the 
switching probabilities of secondary users but decreases their payoff. Also, increasing sL  does 
not change the payoff of malicious users but leads to change their switching probabilities. 
Fig. 11 shows that by increasing mn , the motivation of malicious users for switching to bands 
of state D  is reduced, because with increasing mn , they become confident about their ability to 
attack more secondary users and thus will prefer to stay in their bands. For the same reasons, 
secondary users know that with increasing mn , the probability of finding a free band is reduced. 
So, they prefer to stay in their states, but this reduction is not significant (Fig. 11). With 
increasing mn , the payoff  of malicious users is increased. The payoff of secondary users starts to 
decrease with increasing mn  which finally leads to a negative payoff. In the negative payoff, 
secondary users must leave the network for the next time slot.  
 
 
Fig. 11. Payoffs and switching probabilities versus number of the malicious users 
 
V. Conclusion 
The radio frequency is an open medium, thus jamming attack can be a possible attack for the 
cognitive radio networks. It prevents the secondary users from accessing the spectrum band. 
However, malicious users can coordinate with each other to perform a coordinated jamming 
attack.  
In this paper, the performance of cognitive radio networks was investigated upon a 
coordination jamming attack. In this model, both malicious and secondary users have a central 
base station and send the information of their bands to malicious-BS and secondary-BS, 
respectively. According to the information received from users, secondary-BS and malicious-BS 
distribute their users over appropriate bands. The spectrum band is classified into several states 
and according to the classification a game theoretical model is applied to analyze the behavior of 
both malicious and secondary users in the coordinated jamming attacks. 
  
 
The values of cost in switching to other bands were defined for secondary and malicious users 
as well as the reward values for successful transmission of secondary users and successful attack 
of malicious users.  Meanwhile, the total payoff was calculated for secondary and malicious 
users. Then, their optimal switching probabilities were computed using the game theory. With 
these optimal switching probabilities, secondary and malicious users can opt the most suitable 
bands against rival and prevent from wasting their energies. Moreover, effects of changing the 
values of cost and reward values for secondary and malicious users was also discussed on their 
total payoffs and switching probabilities.  
In this contribution, equal occupation probabilities were proposed by primary users for all 
bands in the network. Future works can concentrate on studying a coordinated jamming attack in 
a spectrum band having different occupation probabilities by primary users. 
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